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Abstract: A new system for web attack detection is presented. It 
follows the anomaly-based approach, therefore known and 
unknown attacks can be detected. The system relies on a XML file 
to classify the incoming requests as normal or anomalous. The 
XML file, which is built from only normal traffic, contains a 
description of the normal behavior of the target web application 
statistically characterized. Any request which deviates from the 
normal behavior is considered an attack. The system has been 
applied to protect a real web application. An increasing number of 
training requests have been used to train the system. Experiments 
show that when the XML file has enough information to closely 
characterize the normal behavior of the target web application, a 
very high detection rate is reached while the false alarm rate 
remains very low. 
 
Keywords: web attacks, intrusion detection system, anomaly 
intrusion detection, web application firewall, web application 
security.  
 
1. Introduction 
Web applications are becoming increasingly popular and 
complex in all sorts of environments, ranging from e-
commerce applications to banking. As a consequence, web 
applications are subject to all sort of attacks. Additionally, 
web applications handle large amounts of sensitive data, 
which makes web applications even more attractive for 
malicious users. The consequences of many attacks might be 
devastating [1], like identity supplanting, sensitive data 
hijacking, access to unauthorized information, web page’s 
content modification, command execution, etc. Therefore it 
is fundamental to protect web applications and to adopt the 
suitable security methods.  
Unfortunately, conventional firewalls, operating at 
network and transport layers, are usually not enough to 
protect against web-specific attacks. To be really effective, 
the detection is to be moved to the application layer. 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) analyzes 
information from a computer or a network to detect 
malicious actions and behaviors that can compromise the 
security of a computer system. When a malicious behavior is 
detected, an alarm is launched. Traditionally, IDS’s have 
been classified as either signature detection systems (also 
called negative approach) or anomaly detection systems 
(positive approach). An hybrid intrusion detection system 
combines the techniques of the two approaches. 
The signature-based approach looks for the signatures of 
known attacks (misuse of the system resources), which 
exploit weaknesses in system and application software. It 
uses pattern matching techniques against a frequently 
updated database of attack signatures. It is useful to detect 
already known attacks or their slight variations, but not the 
new ones or malicious variations that defeat the pattern 
recognition engine. 
The anomaly-based approach looks for behavior or use of 
computer resources deviating from “normal” or “common” 
behavior [1]. The underlying principle of this approach is 
that “attack behavior” differs enough from “normal user 
behavior” thus it can be detected by cataloging and 
identifying the differences involved. First, the “normal” 
behavior must be well defined, which is not an easy task. 
Once normal behavior is fully qualified, irregular behavior 
will be tagged as intrusive. 
One of the major shortcomings of signature-based IDSs is 
their susceptibility to evasion attacks, such as fragmentation, 
avoiding defaults, low-bandwidth attacks, or simply pattern 
changing. Additionally, attack pattern matching systems 
require large signature databases constantly updated. The 
comparison of incoming traffic against every signature in the 
database requires a high computational effort, with the 
consequence of reduced throughput. 
In these scenarios where signature-based IDS's fail, 
anomaly-based systems permit discerning normal traffic 
from suspicious activity without signature matching. 
However, in rather complex environments, such as large 
networks with multiple servers and different operating 
systems, to get an up-to-date and feasible picture of what 
“normal” network traffic should look like, proves to be a 
hard problem. As another disadvantage, the rate of false 
positives (events erroneously classified as attacks) in 
anomaly-based systems is usually higher than in signature 
based ones. Both approaches, anomaly detection and 
signature matching, are compared in Table 1, which shows 
the main features of both security models. 
 
Anomaly detection Signature matching 
It contains a complete  
set of valid requests and  
they are identified  
accurately, therefore it is  
possible to detect new  
attacks, zero-day attacks 
and variations of attacks 
Only the attacks described 
in the signatures can be 
detected. The set of 
invalid requests is 
incomplete and their 
accuracy cannot be 
defined. As a 
consequence, new attacks 
and malicious variations 
cannot be detected 
As the definition of the 
valid requests is complete 
and accurate, the 
The administrative work is 
high as the signatures 
have to be updated to 
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administrative overhead is 
low 
contain the new attacks 
and the new variations of 
the existing attacks 
Definition of normal 
traffic is not an easy task 
in large and complex web 
applications 
Signatures are easy to 
develop and understand if  
the behavior to be 
identified is known 
The normal behavior is 
defined, it is not needed to 
define a signature for 
every attack and their 
variations 
A signature has to be 
defined for every attack 
and their variations 
It works well against self-
modifying attacks 
Usually, it does not work 
very accurately against 
attacks with self-
modifying behavior. Such 
attacks are usually 
generated by humans and 
polymorphic worms 
It is not easy to know 
exactly which issue 
caused the alert 
The events generated by a 
signature-based IDS can 
inform very precisely 
about what caused the 
alert, which makes it 
easier to research on the 
causing issue 
The resource usage is low There is a heavy usage of 
the resources 
It is scalable It is not scalable 
 
Table 1. Comparison between the anomaly-based and the 
signature-based  security models. 
The results of signature-based IDSs depend on the actual 
signature configuration for each web application, hence it is 
complicated to compare these results with anomaly-based 
IDS’s ones. 
Multiple and varied techniques have been used to solve 
the general intrusion detection problem [3], such as 
clustering [4], [5] Markov models [6], [7], neural networks 
[8], [9], fuzzy logic [10],[11], genetic algorithms [12], [18], 
artificial immune systems [14], etc. Even though there are 
still some open challenges in intrusion detection.  
Web Application Firewalls (WAF) analyzes the HTTP 
traffic (application layer) in order to detect malicious 
behaviors that can compromise the security of web 
applications. 
In this paper, a simple and effective anomaly-based WAF 
is presented. This system relies on an XML file to describe 
what a normal web application is. Any irregular behavior is 
flagged as intrusive. The XML file must be tailored for every 
target application to be protected. Further details about the 
system will be explained in the next sections of this paper.  
Up to now, some of the most important works developed 
to solve the web attacks detection problem are [6], [15] and 
[16].  
[6] presents an anomaly-based system which uses Markov 
chains to model the HTTP traffic. The packet payload is 
parameterised for the evaluation of the incoming traffic: it is 
segmented into a certain number of contiguous blocks, 
which are subsequently quantized according to a previously 
trained scalar codebook. Then, the temporal sequence of the 
symbols obtained is evaluated by means of a Markov model 
obtained from the training phase.  
The system presented in [15] is also anomaly-based. It 
analyzes client queries that reference server-side programs. 
More precisely, the analysis techniques used by the tool take 
advantage of the particular structure of HTTP queries that 
contain parameters. The system creates models for a wide-
range of different features of these queries, such as attribute 
length, attribute character distribution, attribute presence or 
absence, attribute order, access frequency, inter-request time 
delay, etc. The access patterns of such queries and their 
parameters are compared with established profiles that are 
specific to the program or active document being referenced. 
[16] introduces an intrusion detection software component 
based on text-mining techniques. By using text 
categorisation, it is capable of learning the characteristics of 
both normal and malicious user behaviour from the log 
entries generated by the web application server. This IDS is 
evaluated on a real web-based telemedicine system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, 
concepts of web applications and web attacks are exposed, 
as well as a description of the most important web 
vulnerabilities. In Sect. 3 a system overview is given, where 
system architecture, normal behavior modeling and attack 
detection are explained. Section 4 refers to experiments. This 
section includes XML file generation, artificial traffic 
generation, the training phase, the test phase, WAF 
protection mechanisms, performance measurement and 
results. Section 5 describes system limitations and suggests 
future work. Finally, in Sec. 6, the conclusions of this work 
are captured. 
2. Web Applications and Web Attacks 
2.1 Web applications 
Web applications are usually divided into three logical tiers:  
presentation, application and storage. Typically, a web server 
is the first tier (presentation), an engine using some web 
content technology is the middle tier (application logic) and 
finally, a database is the third tier (storage). Some examples 
can be cited: IIS and Apache are popular web servers, Web 
Logic Server and Apache Tomcat are well known 
applications servers and finally, Oracle and MySQL are 
frequently used databases. Separating the presentation tier 
from the storage one facilitates the design and the 
maintenance of the web site. The web server sends requests 
to the middle tier, which services them by making queries 
and updates against the database and generates a user 
interface. 
 Most of the Web contents are dynamic.  Dynamic pages, 
in contrast to static pages, retrieve its content from the 
database on demand. There are a number of platform-
specific technologies to achieve the on-the-fly generation of 
web content, such as CGI programming in Perl, Python, or 
C/C++, as well as JSP, ASP.NET, or PHP pages, 
programmed in a variety of languages such as Java, VB, C#, 
etc. Dynamic pages require access to the back-end database 
where the application information is stored, hence attacks 
against these pages usually aim at the data stored in the 
database. 
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2.2 Web Attacks 
Web attacks can be classified as static or dynamic, 
depending on whether they are common to all web 
applications hosted on the same platform or depend on the 
specific application [2]. 
Static web attacks look for security vulnerabilities in the 
web application platform: web server, application server, 
database server, firewall, operating system, and third-party 
components, such as shopping carts, cryptographic modules, 
payment gateways, etc. These security pitfalls comprise 
well-known vulnerabilities and erroneous configurations. 
There are both commercial and free automated tools capable 
of scanning a server in search of such known vulnerabilities 
and configuration errors. A common feature of all these 
vulnerabilities is that they request pages, file extensions, or 
elements that do not form part of the web application as 
intended for the end user. Therefore it is very easy to detect 
suspicious behavior when any resource which does not 
belong to the application visible by the user is requested. 
Dynamic web attacks only request legal pages of the 
application but they subvert the expected parameters. 
Manipulation of input arguments can lead to several attacks 
with different consequences: disclosure of  information 
about the platform, information about other users theft, 
command execution, etc. In this case, provided with 
information regarding the type and range of values expected 
as user input, it is possible to detect any request trying to 
manipulate normal inputs. 
The WAF presented in this paper incorporates techniques 
which make possible to detect both static and dynamic web 
attacks.  
In the next subsection some of the most important web 
attacks are exposed.  
2.3 Web Vulnerabilities   
There is a large amount of web vulnerabilities. In this 
subsection the most important ones are explained, 
considering the frequency of exploitation and the impact. 
The attacks listed are included in some way in the Owasp 
Top Ten Project [17, 13], which presents the most critical 
web application security vulnerabilities. Next, a description 
of the most relevant web vulnerabilities is presented.  
 
• Obsolete file existence. Obsolete files can reveal 
information about the application and show facilities to 
access to the server data.  
• Default file or example file existence. Default and 
example files make easier the access to the server data. 
• Server source file disclosure. An attacker could access to 
the server files.  
• HTTP method validity. Some HTTP methods allow the 
modification of the application, hence these methods 
should never be available for an attacker.  
• CRLF injection. By including control characters used by 
operating systems to indicate the end of a line, it is 
possible to execute illegal commands in the system. 
• Failure to restrict URL Access. Frequently, an 
application only protects sensitive functionality by 
preventing the display of links or URLs to unauthorized 
users. Attackers can use this weakness to access and 
perform unauthorized operations by accessing those 
URLs directly. 
•  Invalid parameters. Parameters in the URL or in the 
body of the request can be manipulated. If the 
information from web requests is not validated before 
being used by a web application, attackers can use these 
flaws to attack backside components through a web 
application. 
• Command injection. Web applications pass parameters 
when they access external systems or the local operating 
system. If an attacker can embed malicious commands in 
these parameters, the external system may execute those 
commands on behalf of the web application. 
• Cross  site scripting (XSS). It can be perfomed when an 
application takes user supplied data and sends it to a web 
browser without first validating or encoding that content. 
XSS allows attackers to execute javascript in the victim's 
browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, 
possibly introduce worms, etc. 
• SQL injection. It occurs in the database layer of an 
application. The vulnerability is present when user input 
is either incorrectly filtered for string literal escape 
characters embedded in SQL statements or user input is 
not strongly typed and thereby unexpectedly executed in 
the database. 
• Buffer overflows. Web application components in some 
languages that do not properly validate input (in this 
case, specially its length) can be forced to crash and, in 
some cases, used to take control of a process. These 
components can include CGI, libraries, drivers, and web 
application server components. 
• Broken Authentication and Session Management. 
Account credentials and session tokens are often not 
properly protected. Attackers compromise passwords, 
keys, or authentication tokens to assume other users' 
identities. 
• Broken Access control. Restrictions on what 
authenticated users are allowed to do are not properly 
enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to access 
other users’ accounts, view sensitive files, or use 
unauthorized functions. 
• Remote administration flaws. Many web applications 
allow administrators to access the site using a web 
interface. If these administrative functions are not very 
carefully protected, an attacker can gain full access to all 
aspects of a site. 
• Web application and server misconfiguration. Having a 
strong server configuration standard is critical to a secure 
web application. These servers have many configuration 
options that affect security and are not always secure 
after the default installation. 
• Malicious File Execution. Code vulnerable to remote file 
inclusion allows attackers to include hostile code and 
data, resulting in devastating attacks, such as total server 
compromise. Malicious file execution attacks affect PHP, 
XML and any framework which accepts filenames or 
files from users. 
• Insecure Direct Object Reference. A direct object 
reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to 
an internal implementation object, such as a file, 
directory, database record, or key, as a URL or form 
parameter. Attackers can manipulate those references to 
 4
access other objects without authorization. 
• Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling. 
Applications can unintentionally leak information about 
their configuration, internal workings, or violate privacy 
through a variety of application problems. Attackers use 
this weakness to steal sensitive data, or conduct more 
serious attacks. 
 
Attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities will be used to test 
the performance of the WAF being presented, thus these 
attacks are included in the malicious traffic generated to test 
the system. Traffic generation is explained in Sec. 4.3 and 
the test phase is described in Sec. 4.5. The mechanisms used 
by the WAF to protect all the before mentioned 
vulnerabilities are listed in Sec. 4.6. 
3. System Overview  
3.1 Architecture 
Our WAF analyzes HTTP requests sent by a client browser 
trying to get access to a web server. The analysis takes place 
exclusively at the application layer. The system follows the 
anomaly-based approach, detecting known and unknown 
web attacks, in contrast with existing signature-based WAFs. 
ModSecurity [19] is a popular signature-based WAF.  
In our architecture, the system operates as a proxy located 
between the client and the web server. Likewise, the system 
might be embedded as a module within the server. However, 
the first approach enjoys the advantage of being independent 
of the web platform. 
This proxy analyzes all the traffic sent by the client. The 
input of the detection process consists of a collection of 
HTTP requests {r1, r2, . . . rn}. The output is a single bit ai 
for each input request ri, which indicates whether the request 
is normal or anomalous. The proxy is able to work in two 
different modes of operation: as an IDS or as an IPS. 
In detection mode, the proxy simply analyzes the 
incoming packets and tries to find suspicious patterns. If a 
suspicious request is detected, the proxy launches an alert; 
otherwise, it remains inactive. In any case, the request will 
reach the web server. When operating in detection mode, 
attacks could succeed, whereas false positives do not limit 
the system functionality. 
In prevention mode, the proxy receives requests from 
clients and analyzes them. If the request is valid, the proxy 
routes it to the server, and sends back the received response 
to the client. If not, the proxy blocks the request, and sends 
back a generic denied access page to the client. Thus, the 
communication between proxy and server is established only 
when the request is deemed as valid. 
A diagram of WAF’s architecture is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Web Application Firewall architecture 
3.2 Normal Behavior Description 
Prior to the detection process, the system needs a precise 
picture of what the normal behavior is in a specific web 
application. For this purpose, our system relies on an XML 
file which contains a thorough description of the web 
application’s normal behavior. Once a request is received, 
the system compares it with the normal behavior model. If 
the difference exceeds the given thresholds, then the request 
is flagged as an attack and an alert is launched. 
The XML file contains rules regarding to the correctness 
of HTTP verbs, HTTP headers, accessed resources (files), 
arguments, and values for the arguments. This file 
contains three main nodes: 
 
Verbs. The verbs node simply specifies the list of allowed 
HTTP verbs.  
 
Headers. The headers node specifies a list of some HTTP 
headers and their allowed values.  
 
Directories. The directories node has a tree-like structure, in 
close correspondence to the web application’s directory 
structure. 
1. Each directory in the web application space is represented 
in the XML file by a directory node, allowing nesting of 
directories within directories. The attribute name defines 
these nodes. 
2. Each file in the web application space is represented by a 
file node within a directory node and is defined by its 
attribute name. 
3. Input arguments are represented by argument nodes 
within the corresponding file node. Each argument is defined 
by its name and a boolean value requiredField indicating 
whether the request should be rejected if the argument is 
missing. 
4. Legal values for arguments should meet some statistical 
rules, which are represented by a stats node within the 
corresponding argument node. These statistical properties 
together give a description of the expected values. 
Each relevant property is defined by an attribute within the 
stats node. In our approach we considered the following 
relevant properties: 
• special: set of special characters (different from letters 
and digits) allowed 
•  lengthMin: minimum input length 
•  lengthMax: maximum input length 
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•  letterMin: minimum percentage of letters 
•  letterMax: maximum percentage of letters 
•  digitMin: minimum percentage of digits 
•  digitMax: maximum percentage of digits 
• specialMin: minimum percentage of special characters 
(of those included in the property “special”) 
• specialMax: maximum percentage of special characters 
(of those included in the property “special”) 
 
These properties allow the definition of four intervals 
(length, letters, digits and special characters) for the allowed 
values for each argument. Only the values within the interval 
are accepted. Requests with argument values exceeding their 
corresponding normal intervals will be rejected. 
The adequate construction of the XML file with the 
suitable intervals is crucial for a good detection process. An 
example of XML configuration file is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1" 
standalone="no"?> 
 
<configuration> 
<verbs> 
<verb>GET</verb> 
<verb>POST</verb> 
</verbs> 
<headers> 
<rule name="Accept-Charset"  
value="ISO-8859-1"/> 
</headers> 
<directories> 
<directory name="shop"> 
<file name="index.jsp"/> 
<directory name="public"> 
<file name="add.jsp"> 
<argument name="quantity"  
requiredField="true"> 
<stats maxDigit="100"   
       maxLength="3"  
      maxLetter="0"   
       maxOther="0" 
  minDigit="100"     
  minLength="1" 
  minLetter="0"   
  minOther="0"  
  special="" /> 
</argument> 
<argument name="product_name" 
requiredField="true"> 
<stats maxDigit="0"  
       maxLength="15"   
       maxLetter="92.94"   
       maxOther="10.01"    
       minDigit="0"  
       minLength="5"  
       minLetter="89.91"  
       minOther="7.15"  
       special="" />  
  <argument name="price" 
requiredField="true"> 
<stats maxDigit="100"  
       maxLength="3"  
       maxLetter="0"  
       maxOther="0"  
       minDigit="100"   
       minLength="1"  
       minLetter="0"             
       minOther="0"  
       special="" />  
 
... 
 
</directories> 
</configuration> 
 
Figure 2. XML file example 
 
3.3 Detection Process 
In the detection process, our system follows an approach of 
the form “deny everything unless explicitly allowed”, also 
known as positive security model.  
The detection process takes place in the proxy. It consists 
of several steps, each constituting a different line of defense, 
in which the different parts of the request are checked with 
the aid of the XML file. If an incoming request fails to pass 
one of these lines of defense, an attack is assumed: a 
customizable error page is returned to the user and the 
request is logged for further inspection. It is important to 
stress that these requests will never reach the web server 
when operating in prevention mode. 
The detection process is composed of the following steps:  
1. Verb check. The verb must be present in the XML file, 
otherwise the request is rejected. For example, in the 
applications in which only GET, POST and HEAD are 
required to work correctly, the XML file could be configured 
accordingly, thus rejecting requests that use any other verb. 
2. Headers check. If the header appears in the XML file, its 
value must be included too. Different values will not be 
accepted, thus preventing attacks embedded in these 
elements. 
3. Resource test. The system checks whether the requested 
resource is valid. For this purpose, the XML configuration 
file contains a complete list of all files that are allowed to be 
served. If the requested resource is not present in the list, a 
web attack is assumed. 
4. Arguments test. If the request has any argument, the 
following aspects are checked: 
a) It is checked that all arguments are allowed for the 
resource. If the request includes arguments not listed in the 
XML file for the corresponding resource, a manipulation of 
the arguments is assumed and thus the request is rejected. 
b) It is confirmed that all mandatory arguments are present in 
the request. If any mandatory argument 
(requiredField=”true”) is not present in the request, it is 
rejected.  
c) Argument values are cheched. An incoming request will 
be allowed if all parameter values are identified as normal. 
Argument values are decoded before being checked. For the 
argument value test, the statistical properties of the 
corresponding argument are used. If any property of the 
argument is outside the corresponding interval or contains 
any forbidden special character, the request is rejected. 
 
 These steps allow the detection of both static attacks, 
which request resources that do not belong to the 
application, and dynamic attaks, which manipulate the 
arguments of the request. Figure 3 depicts the detection 
process.  
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Figure 3. Detection process flow 
 
4. Experiments 
4.1 Case Study: Web Shopping 
The WAF has been configured to protect a specific web 
application, consisting of an e-commerce web store, where 
users can register and buy products using a shopping cart. 
4.2 XML File Generation 
As already stated, the XML file describes the normal 
behavior of the web application. Therefore, to train the 
system and configure this file, only normal (non-malicious) 
traffic directed to the target web application is required. 
Nevertheless, how to obtain only normal traffic may not be 
an easy task. To obtain good detection results thousands of 
requests are needed. There are some alternatives to obtain 
normal traffic: 
1. Thousands of legitimate users can surf the target web 
application and generate normal traffic. However, getting 
thousands of people to surf the web might not be easy. 
2. The application can be published in the Internet. 
Unfortunately, attacks will be mixed with normal traffic, so 
this traffic cannot be used to train the system. 
3. Traffic can be generated artificially. Although the traffic is 
not real, we can be sure that only normal traffic is included. 
For our purposes, we considered artificial traffic 
generation to be the most suitable approach. 
4.3 Artificial Traffic Generation  
In our approach, normal and anomalous request databases 
are generated artificially with the help of dictionaries. 
 
Dictionaries. Dictionaries are data files which contain real 
data to fill the different arguments used in the target 
application. Names, surnames, addresses, etc., are examples 
of dictionaries used. 
A set of dictionaries containing only allowed values is 
used to generate the normal request database. A different set 
of dictionaries is used to generate the anomalous request 
database. The latter dictionaries contain both known attacks 
and illegal values with no malicious intention. 
 
Normal Traffic Generation. Allowed HTTP requests are 
generated for each page in the web application. Arguments 
and cookies in the page, if any, are also filled in with values 
from the normal dictionaries. The result is a normal request 
database (NormalDB). Some requests from NormalDB will 
be used in the training phase and some others will be used in 
the test phase.  
 
Anomalous Traffic Generation. Illegal HTTP requests are 
generated with the help of anomalous dictionaries. Examples 
of the attacks trying to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in 
Sec. 2.3 are included in the anomalous traffic in order to test 
the system. There are three types of anomalous requests: 
 
1. Static attacks fabricate the resource requested. These 
requests include attacks like obsolete files, configuration 
files, default files, etc. 
2. Dynamic attacks modify valid request arguments: SQL 
injection, cross-site scripting, invalid parameters, command 
injection, buffer overflows, broken authentication and 
session tampering, etc. 
3. Unintentional illegal requests. These requests should 
also be rejected even though they do not have malicious 
intention.  
The result is an anomalous request database 
(AnomalousDB), which will be used only in the test phase. 
4.4 Training Phase 
During the training phase, the system learns the web 
application normal behavior. The aim is to obtain the XML 
file from normal requests. In the construction of the XML 
file, different HTTP aspects must be considered: 
• Argument values are characterized by extracting their 
statistical properties from the requests. 
• Verbs, resources and certain headers found in the 
requests are included directly in the XML file as allowed 
elements. 
4.5 Test Phase 
During the test phase, depicted in Fig. 4, the proxy accepts 
requests from both databases, NormalDB and AnomalousDB, 
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and relies on the XML file to decide whether the requests are 
normal or anomalous. Considering the amount of correctly 
and incorrectly classified requests, the performance of the 
system can be measured and the results obtained.  
 
 
Figure 4. System test phase 
4.6 WAF Protection Mechanisms 
As previously stated, attacks trying to explote the 
vulnerabilities described in Sec.2.3 have been included into 
the malicious traffic (Sec. 4.3) and they have been used to 
test the performance of the system.  
When the normal behavior is correctly identified, all the 
previously mentioned attacks can be detected  (and therefore 
all the vulnerabilities protected) by the WAF presented in 
this paper. This section shows how the characteristics and 
mechanisms used by the WAF are effective to protect 
against these attacks. The WAF’s mechanisms can detect 
both static and dynamic attacks.  
When allowed directories and files are completely 
specified, the system protects against third party 
misconfiguration and known vulnerabilities. Attacks against 
these vulnerabilities are usually very well documented and 
publicized. They rely on requesting resources present by 
default in web servers which a legitimate user will never 
request directly and thus are easy to spot. Therefore, the 
directories and files enumeration can prevent from attacks 
exploiting obsolete file existence, default file or example file 
existence, server source file disclosure, HTTP method 
validity, failure to restrict URL access, web application and 
server misconfiguration, etc.  
Attacks manipulating parameters are fenced off by the 
proper definition of the statistical intervals. In the case of 
buffer overflow, the length property is of paramount 
importance. Many attacks make use of special characters 
(typically different from letters and from digits) in order to 
perform malicious actions. For instance, this is the case of 
SQL injection, which uses characters with special meaning 
in SQL to get queries or commands unexpectedly executed. 
For this reason, the minimum and maximum percentage of 
letters, digits and special characters are crucial for 
recognizing these attacks. Even more, any special character 
present in the input argument is not allowed unless it is 
included in the property called “special”. The interval check 
help to frustrate attacks exploting  vulnerabilities such as 
CRLF injection, invalid parameters, command injection, 
XSS, SQL injection, buffer overflow, broken authentication 
and session management, etc.  
4.7 Performance measurement 
The performance of the detector is then measured by 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves [20]. A 
ROC curve plots the attack detection rate (true positives, TP) 
against the false alarm rate (false positives, FP). 
 
TPDetectionRate
TP FN
= +  (1) 
 
FPFalseAlarmRate
FP TN
= +  (2) 
 
The parameter of the ROC curve is the number of requests 
used in the training phase. 
4.8 Results 
Several experiments have been performed using an increased 
amount of training requests in the training phase. For each 
experiment, the proxy received 1000 normal requests and 
1000 attacks during the test phase. 
Figure 5 (a) and (b) show the results obtained by the WAF 
while protecting the tested web application. As can be seen 
in Fig. 5 (a), very satisfactory results are obtained: the false 
alarm rate is close to 0 whereas the detection rate is close to 
1. As shown in Fig. 5 (b), at the beginning, with a low 
amount of training requests, the proxy rejects almost all 
requests (both normal and attacks). As a consequence, the 
detection rate is perfect (1) and the false positive rate is high. 
As the training progresses, the false alarm rate decreases 
quickly and the detection rate remains reasonably high. 
Therefore, this WAF is adequate to protect from web 
attacks due to its capacity to detect different attacks 
generating a very little amount of false alarms. 
It is important to notice that when the XML file closely 
characterizes the web application normal behavior, the 
different kinds of attacks can be detected and few false 
alarms are raised. 
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Figure 5 (a). ROC curve of WAF protecting the web store 
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Figure 5 (b). The false alarm rate and the detection rate vs 
the number of training requests is plotted 
5. Limitations and Future Work 
As shown in the previous section, when the XML file is 
configured correctly, the system succeeds in detecting any 
kind of web attacks. Thus, the main issue is how to 
automatically configure the XML description file. In our 
approach, the XML file is built from a set of allowed 
requests in the target web application. An important 
advantage of this solution is that the XML file is built 
automatically from the normal traffic, thus the directory 
structure of the web application and the statistical 
characterization of the arguments is automatically inferred 
from the input requests. However, obtaining only normal and 
non-malicious traffic may not be an easy task, as was 
discussed in Sec. 4.2. Therefore, the main limitation consists 
in correctly implementing the training phase for any web 
application. 
Other limitations arise when protecting complex web 
applications. For instance, web sites that create and remove 
pages dynamically, generate new URLs to access resources, 
or allow users for updating contents, may difficult the XML 
file configuration. Further modifications of the system will 
attempt to solve these problems, by statistically 
characterizing the URLs of allowed resources. 
Future work refers to signing cookies and hidden fields in 
order to avoid cookie poisoning and hidden field 
manipulation attacks. Also, URL patterns will be used in 
describing sites with dynamic resources. 
6. Conclusions 
We presented a simple and efficient web attack detection 
system or Web Application Firewall (WAF). As the system 
is based on the anomaly-based methodology it proved to be 
able to protect web applications from both known and 
unknown attacks. The system analyzes input requests and 
decides whether they are anomalous or not. For the decision, 
the WAF relies on an XML file which specifies web 
application normal behavior.  
The experiments show that as long as the XML file 
correctly defines normality for a given target application, 
near perfect results are obtained. Thus, the main challenge is 
how to create an accurate XML file in a fully automated 
manner for any web application. We show that inasmuch 
great amounts of normal (non-malicious) traffic are available 
for the target application, this automatic configuration is 
possible using a statistical characterization of the input 
traffic. 
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